We propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the problems associated to unilateral immigration policy in receiving countries and for evaluating the grounds for reform of international institutions governing immigration. We build a model with multiple destination countries and show that immigration policy in one country is in ‡uenced by measures adopted abroad as migrants choose where to locate (in part) in response to di¤erences in immigration policy. This interdependence gives rise to a leakage e¤ect of immigration policy, an international externality well documented in the empirical literature. In this environment, immigration policy becomes strategic and unilateral behavior may lead to coordination failures, where receiving countries are stuck in welfare inferior equilibria. We then study the conditions under which a coordination failure is more likely to emerge and argue that multilateral institutions that help receiving countries make immigration policy commitments would address this ine¢ ciency.
Introduction
What type of multilateral institutions do countries need to govern international migrations?
Several economists have recently raised this question (among others, Bhagwati, 2003 , Hatton, 2007 , and Hanson, 2009 ). In particular, Hatton (2007) examines whether the basic principles governing the World Trade Organization could improve international cooperation on migration between sending and receiving countries.
The present work aims at contributing to this debate but takes a somewhat di¤erent approach for two reasons. In our view, a prerequisite for a precise answer to the above question is the identi…cation of the international externalities associated with unilateral policy-making in migration policy. In some sense, this is a key lesson that can be inferred from the economic literature on the multilateral trading system. As Staiger (1999 and show, the GATT/WTO system has e¤ectively improved international trade policy cooperation precisely because it provides a framework to neutralize a key cross-border spillover associated with unilateral policy-making in the trade domain, the terms-of-trade externality. Second, the scope of our analysis is di¤erent -and possibly more limited-compared to Hatton (2007) .
Rather than looking at the problems of international cooperation between host and sending economies, we focus on the interaction of immigration measures implemented by countries that are on the receiving end of immigration. Our goal is to clearly identify the externality associated with immigration policy in this set of countries and to investigate the welfare implications of this economic interdependence. 1 A large body of empirical literature has recently studied the long-run determinants of immigration policy and found four key (and somehow interrelated) channels: distributional, political economy, non-economic and international determinants. Distributional factors include the e¤ect of immigration on the labor market and on welfare systems (Borjas, 1994 , Boeri et al., 2002 , Razin et al., 2002 . In turn, distributional determinants are channelled into government policies through voting and/or lobbying activity by interest groups that stand to lose or gain from immigration (Goldin, 1993 , Facchini et al., 2008 . Noneconomic forces, such as racism or xenophobia, may in ‡uence voters'attitudes -and, hence, immigration policy (Dustmann and Preston, 2007 , and O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Finally, and crucially for the present work, immigration policy abroad is a determinant of immigration policy at home (Timmer and Williamson, 1998 , Boeri and Brücker, 2005 , Hatton and Williamson, 2005 . The positive correlation between domestic and foreign measures suggests that countries aim at anticipating an externality associated with the immigration policy of other destination countries.
As these international determinants are a key concern of this paper, we brie ‡y review the available evidence. In their historical account of migratory ‡ows and immigration policy in the New World in the late 19th and early 20th century, Timmer and Williamson (1998) argue that countries in the New World must have paid close attention to each others'policies as migrants were pulled from and pushed toward one country in response to less or more restrictive policies in others. 2 In particular, they …nd that "Australia's openness decreased ‡ows to Canada, Brazil's pro-immigrants subsidies reduced ‡ows to Australia, and Argentina saw an increased Contrasting with these developments in the empirical literature, there have been few attempts to integrate these factors into formal models of immigration policy formation. In particular, most existing models, such as Benhabib (1996) Ortega (2005) and Facchini and Willman (2005) , incorporate some form of domestic factors, but are silent about international determinants. 3 The main reason is that standard theory focuses on the e¤ects of immigration on a single receiving economy 2 See also Hatton and Williamson (2005) . 3 There are some recent noticeable exceptions that are discussed at the end of the Introduction. 3 and considers as exogenous the migratory decision of foreign workers (see Borjas, 1995) . 4 These features, by construction, shut down any possible cross-border spillover created by immigration policy. The present work contributes to …lling this gap in the formal literature by providing a simple and tractable model of immigration policy interdependence.
In our model immigration policy and migration choices are endogenous. The set up considers two regions. The receiving region is formed of a set of identical countries that choose independently immigration policy. In order to make a convincing case of the mechanism discussed in this paper, we rely on a general model that is broadly consistent with distributional, political economy and non-economic determinants of immigration policy (a speci…c model is presented in Appendix A). Immigration is assumed to have bene…ts and costs on host economies, so that there is an optimal number of foreign workers for each receiving country. The sending region is populated by a set of workers who can choose whether to migrate or not and -to a certain extent-in which country to move to. Migratory decisions depend on the economic incentives that foreign workers face and on the policy regulating migratory ‡ows enacted in the receiving countries.
If the world had only a single receiving country, a host government could easily select a policy that supports the e¢ cient level of immigration -that is, the level that optimally trades o¤ the costs and bene…ts of immigration. Governments, however, do not act in a vacuum: immigration policy in one country alters the migratory choices of foreign workers and, hence, the ‡ows of migrants into other destinations (the immigration policy spillover). Note that this externality is created by the international mobility of prospective migrants. When foreign workers choose, not only whether to migrate or not, but also where to migrate (i.e. the destination country), policy restrictions (liberalizations) in one country increase (decrease) migratory ‡ows in other receiving economies, as a larger number of migrants will target the country with lower restrictions. In other words, the costs and bene…ts of immigration in any host economy are, in part, determined by the policy stance of other receiving countries. This international externality lowers the ability of national governments to optimally manage their immigration policy.
In this interdependent environment, coordination failures can materialize that lead to 4 Few theoretical contributions have considered the interdependence between immigration policy in the host economy and immigration decisions. See, in particular, Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007) , Bianchi (2007) and Giordani and Ruta (2010) . 4 ine¢ cient equilibria. The choice of immigration policy is strategic and de…nes a symmetric, simultaneous game among all destination countries from which multiple symmetric policy equilibria emerge that can be Pareto-ranked. The "cooperative solution", that is, the immigration policy associated with the optimal number of migrants for each country, is only one in the continuum of Nash equilibria of this policy game. Coordination failures in immigration policy may arise because, for each policy maker, expectations on the behavior of the governments of other destination economies are critical in the determination of the policy outcome of the receiving region. For instance, if any one government expects that others will strengthen immigration barriers, then it will …nd it convenient to restrict its policy stance to neutralize the negative externality of an excessive in ‡ux of migrants, thus triggering a series of restrictive measures. Too little immigration will result relative to the e¢ cient level for the overall destination region. Similarly, beliefs of immigration liberalizations by other receiving economies will trigger a reduction in restrictions that will result in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium characterized by too much immigration.
Once we identify the problem that characterizes immigration policy in this framework, we discuss two further issues. First, we analyze the problem of equilibrium selection and show that coordination failures in immigration policy are not only possible, but they are also likely to emerge in presence of uncertainty on the policy strategy of other receiving governments. The game-theoretic literature has proposed alternative equilibrium re…nements for coordination games admitting a multiplicity of equilibria. These re…nements stress the fact that players may coordinate on a strategy which is less risky, even if Pareto-dominated. 5 In particular, we characterize the immigration policy equilibrium that is robust to strategic uncertainty (Andersson et al., 2010) and show that the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium is not robust -i.e. that the unilateral policy outcome may well support ine¢ ciently low or high immigration.
The second issue that we investigate is how an increase in the international mobility of migrants (for instance due to technological innovations, such as improvements in transportation and communication means) a¤ects the "likelihood" of a coordination failure. We …nd that an increase in migrants'mobility does not change the e¢ cient policy for the receiving region, 5 The classic work is Harsanyi and Selten (1988) on the risk-dominant equilibrium. Cooper et al. (1990 and 1992) and van Huyck et al. (1990) …nd that coordination failures are likely to arise in experimental settings. For a survey of the empirical literature see Cooper (1999) , chapter 1.
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but it expands the set of equilibria (a measure of the indeterminacy of equilibria) and alters the robust equilibrium, as it increases each policy maker's uncertainty about other governments'strategies. Intuitively, both …ndings can be rationalized as an increased international mobility of migrants magni…es the cross-border externality associated with immigration policy. This suggests that the "globalization" may be amplifying the chances of coordination failures across destination countries, thus augmenting the need for policy coordination in the immigration domain.
While we leave a further discussion of the policy implications of our model to the conclusion, some preliminary considerations can be put forward. First, while both trade policy and immigration policy are characterized by a cross-border externality, the immigration policy game has radically di¤erent features. Trade policy interactions determine a (terms-of-trade driven) prisoner' s dilemma situation, while interactions in the domain of immigration policy lead to a trust dilemma, a coordination problem where governments achieve e¢ cient policies only if they make mutually consistent decisions. Second, while the trade policy game leads to too little trade, coordination failures in immigration policy may determine either too little or too much immigration from the perspective of the receiving world. Third, multilateral institutions should help countries escape ine¢ cient equilibria. This theory suggests that immigration policy commitments (that can be credibly enforced) can provide a coordination device to receiving countries.
Our work is related to several recent studies. The literature on asylum seeking has modelled the spillover e¤ect in national refugee laws and emphasized that coordination problems may emerge in this context (Hatton, The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the multiple-country framework.
In this setting, we formalize the immigration decision of foreign workers and the immigration policy spillover. In Section 3 we prove the existence of a multiplicity of Nash equilibria and carry out the comparative statics analysis. Section 4 studies the issue of equilibrium selection under strategic uncertainty. A concluding section discusses the implications of this model for the design of international institutions governing immigration.
A Multiple-Country Model of Immigration Policy
In this section we introduce a model of immigration policy with a sending region, populated by F workers, and a receiving region composed of m countries, indexed by h = 1; :::; m. Each host economy has identical fundamentals, but decides immigration policy independently of the other destination countries. Foreign workers can choose whether to migrate or not and where to locate in the receiving region. This setting is su¢ cient to determine the international spillover characterizing immigration policy and, hence, the type of strategic problem associated with unilateral immigration policy in the receiving world.
Immigration has bene…ts and costs for the host economies. De…ne the welfare of the generic economy h in the receiving region as a continuous function in the number of immigrants in the country, W h (I h ), and suppose that this function admits one and only one …nite maximum at I h =Î. This value of immigration is the one which optimally trades o¤ costs and bene…ts of migrants for the host economy. While we are agnostic about the source of these costs and bene…ts, a standard model of immigration policy that supports this structure is presented in Appendix A. 7 
Migratory Choices and the Policy Spillover
We now introduce the migratory choice of foreign workers. Immigration is a non-reversible decision. Each migrant faces a psychological cost to leave her own country, i , which is uniformly distributed in [0; ], where is normalized to 1. The government in h can set up an immigration policy which is parametrized by a cost borne by immigrants once in the new country, h 2 R + . This parameter can be interpreted in several ways, from the cost of bureaucratic procedures that each immigrant faces in the host economy to laws that a¤ect the life of immigrants in the host country, such as the number of years to obtain voting rights or citizenship.
Migrants are internationally mobile, in the sense that in a world formed of several potential host economies they have some freedom in choosing their destination. Clearly, the international mobility of migrants is limited by a series of factors in addition to immigration restrictions in the receiving world, including primarily geographical distance, but possibly other factors such as technology (e.g. communication technologies) or cultural diversity (e.g. adaptability to di¤erent cultures). 6 We capture the limited international mobility of migrants by assuming that foreign workers are of two kinds. A fraction F , with 2 (0; 1), can decide freely which receiving country to move to in the set m ("free foreign workers"). The remaining fraction (1 )F are instead constrained in their choice ("constrained foreign workers"). For reasons of symmetry, we further suppose that each receiving country can attract at most (1 )F=m constrained foreign workers; that is, potential migrants of "constrained type" are distributed uniformly across the receiving region. The parameter captures the international mobility of migrants. A higher value of , that is, an increase in the set of "free foreign workers", can be motivated by several factors that reduce the (non-policy) constraints to the migrants'mobility, such as an improvement in transportation or telecommunication technologies.
A constrained foreign worker in the pool (1 )F=m, indexed by i, will migrate to h if and only if
6 See, among others, Belot and Hatton (2008) and Grogger and Hanson (2008) .
8 where b h is the endogenous net bene…t that the foreign worker receives if she migrates to country h, assumed to be a twice continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing function of h . 7 It is immediate to …nd the threshold value of the psychological cost (such that all those below that value are willing to migrate) as
Given that i is distributed uniformly in [0; 1], the number of constrained migrants to h will
The number of free foreign workers potentially entering each country h is instead given by the whole pool of free foreign workers, F . In addition to satisfying condition (1), free foreign workers will also compare the payo¤ obtained by migrating to country h to the one obtained by migrating to any other receiving country (denoted by h). 8 Free foreign workers will target country h if
Therefore, policy di¤erences in the destination world a¤ect migration choices. Speci…cally, the number of free foreign workers actually migrating to h is 0 if h > h (crowding out),
Finally, if h = h , free migrants are indi¤erent and distribute symmetrically across the receiving region, that is, b h ( h ) F=m for any h.
As a result, immigration ‡ows to country h are a function of h's immigration policy as well as of the measures imposed in the rest of the destination countries. The total number of (constrained plus free) migrants to country h can then be described as
This e¤ect of immigration policy abroad on the ‡ow of migrants into the host economy is the key cross-border externality in this model and the mechanism of economic interdepen-dence that we highlight. Importantly, the theory closely captures the essential international policy spillover emphasized in the empirical literature discussed in the Introduction. This is consistent with a higher value of in the latter immigration episode and, hence, with a stronger policy externality.
exists a pay-o¤ dominant equilibrium belonging to that interval, and that such equilibrium is associated with policy^ which, if implemented by all host countries, is able to "attract" the optimal number of migrants,Î, for all of them. This policy is the one solving equation
All other equilibria around this optimal policy equilibrium are instead suboptimal and represent a coordination failure among the receiving countries driven by the immigration policy spillover.
A coordination failure arises in this game because immigration policies across receiving countries are strategic complements. To give an intuition, start from the optimal policy equilibrium,^ . If all other countries but h restrict their policy above^ , country h is better
We can then write 9
This payo¤ function is drawn in Figure 1 . The solid curve in Figure 1 represents country h's welfare when its immigration policy is equal to the one implemented in the rest of the receiving region (W h h ;F ). The dashed curve captures h's welfare when its policy stance is more restrictive than abroad (W h ( h ; F )), while the dotted curve represents the opposite case (W h h ; F ). Each of them is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave in h (in the standard model of immigration policy developed in appendix we study the conditions for which this is the case -see Appendix B). Note that the optimal number of migrants for country h is unambiguously given byÎ and, hence, the three functions have the same maximum. However, the policy delivering this level of immigration depends on whether this policy is higher, lower or equal to the one implemented abroad. In Figure 1 Policy^ belongs to the interval ; and is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, it is the payo¤ dominant Nash equilibrium in that, if all other countries set up^ , country h is able to attract the optimal number of migrantsÎ by adopting the same policy, h =^ . Equilibria surrounding the optimal policy equilibrium are Pareto-inferior outcomes which result from a coordination failure driven by the international policy spillover associated with migrants' mobility across the receiving region. A graphical representation of the set of equilibria is provided in Figure 2 . We can enunciate the following
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Proposition 1 There exist a lower and an upper threshold, and , such that any symmetric con…guration of immigration policies, ( 1 ; :::; m ) = ( ; :::; ), for which 2 ; , is a Nash equilibrium of the game. The optimal policy equilibrium h =^ 8h belongs to the set of symmetric Nash equlibria. All other equilibria are sub-optimal and are Pareto-ranked by the distance from^ .
Proof. In Appendix C
The logic of the proof is simple and consists of exploiting some of the properties of the three welfare functions W h h ;F ,W h ( h ; F ) ; W h h ; F (such as continuity and strict concavity) to prove that, for any h 2 ; and for any h, it is W h h ;F W h ( h ; F ) ; W h h ; F . 1 1 This reasoning only applies along the interval ; . Suppose for instance h > . In this case, country h's best response would be to slightly undercut policy h . This softer policy (implying a crowding in country h), would be associated with a higher welfare, that is, W h h ; F > W h h ;F . An analogous reasoning applies to policy values below .
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As a result, along that interval enacting the same policy as the rest of the region will be better than enacting any other policy above or below that policy. 12 Another way to look at this set of Nash equilibria is by drawing the reaction curves of the host countries in the immigration policy game. The reaction function of generic country h is drawn as the black line in space h ; h in Figure 3 . For any h 2 ; country h's best response is h = h . Hence, along that interval, the reaction curve is a 45 degree line (as in Bryant's (1983) game). For any h <^ ( h >^ ), country h's best response is to set up^ (^ ) -as that policy allows country h to attract the optimal number of migrants,Î.
Hence, the reaction curve is a horizontal line along that policy value. When h is any value inside the interval [^ ; ), country h's best response is to set up a slightly (by a however small ") tougher immigration policy, and the best response is drawn as the solid black line slightly above the 45 degree line. Finally, when h 2 [ ;^ ), country h's best response is to set up a slightly (by a however small ") softer immigration policy, and the best response is drawn as the solid black line slightly below the 45 degree line. 13 The best-response function of country h can then be written as
The reaction curve of country h is the mirror image of the one of country h and is depicted as the light grey line in Figure 3 . They overlap along the interval ; , which then constitutes the measure of equilibria, while no intersection occurs when h is lower than or higher than . 1 2 Note that removing the assumption of symmetric fundamentals would not alter the logic of this result. Speci…cally, if countries had asymmetric fundamentals, the policy attracting the optimal number of migrants would di¤er across host economies. However, starting from this optimal policy con…guration, strategic complementarities still characterize immigration policy. 1 3 In rigourous mathematical terms the best response function is not de…ned when h belongs to [^ ; ) or to [ ;^ ), the reason being that we have de…ned the policy variable as a continuous variable. With an abuse of notation we write h " instead of ? in the expression for the best-response function (4), as if variable were de…ned as a discrete variable which could only take multiple values of an indivisible ". This is because we here privilege intuition to rigour. Of course, nothing substantial changes.
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The above discussion illustrates the key problem associated with immigration policy when the receiving economy is formed by multiple countries: coordination failures can arise in this environment. The economy can be stuck in an inferior Nash equilibrium where restrictions to immigration are either ine¢ ciently high ( h 2 (^ ; ] 8h) or ine¢ ciently low ( h 2 [ ;^ ) 8h), and hence destination countries fail to attract the "right" number of foreign workers.
The reason for this ine¢ ciency is the international spillover created by immigration policy, which in turn results from the international mobility of migrants (i.e. their ability to choose their destination in addition to whether they want to migrate or not).
Starting at an ine¢ cient equilibrium, no country can improve its welfare with unilateral immigration policy initiatives, but all receiving economies could be made better o¤ under an agreement that called for mutual policy adjustments. In this respect, immigration policy has much to learn from trade policy, even if the structure of the immigration and the trade policy game is quite di¤erent. In particular, most authors consider current immigration policy in advanced economies as too restrictive. 14 In contrast, the analysis of this section shows that receiving countries face a trust dilemma, a coordination problem which leads to multiple equilibria. While in both situations govern-ments can be stuck at an ine¢ cient equilibrium, a key issue of the immigration policy game is equilibrium selection (an issue that does not emerge in a prisoner's dilemma situation, where there is only one equilibrium). Governments may coordinate on the ine¢ cient equilibrium as this is the one that is associated with policy choices that are less "risky", an issue that will be addressed in Section 4.
Migrants'International Mobility and Coordination Failures
An important question is how the set of equilibria is a¤ected by the underlying parameters of the model. In particular, in this subsection we study the e¤ect on the receiving countries of a change in the international mobility of foreign workers ( ). As discussed above, this parameter captures the responsiveness of migrants to di¤erences in the policy stance and is determined by factors, such as technology, that are likely to change over time.
We begin by stating the following Proposition 2 An increase in international mobility of foreign workers ( ) expands the set of symmetric Nash equilibria, while it does not a¤ ect the Pareto dominant equilibrium. That
Proof. In Appendix D.
To grasp the intuition, recall that function W h h ;F is not a¤ected by changes in as the adoption of the same policy across the receiving region neutralizes the spillover e¤ect.
Therefore, the solid curve in Figure 2 does not move as varies. On the other hand, following an increase in , function W h ( h ; F ) shifts leftward and function W h h ; F shifts rightward.
Intuitively, workers' international mobility is responsible for the cross-border externality, which is the source of the equilibrium multiplicity. An increase in international mobility implies a more powerful externality and an ever expanding measure of policy equilibria.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 have two implications. First, higher realizations of parameter , by expanding the set of equilibria, worsen the problem of coordination failure and indeterminacy. Second, as the "new" equilibria are more distant from the optimal policy, they are associated with lower welfare for the receiving region. To put it di¤erently, this result suggests that the new wave of globalization, driven by a fall in transportation and communication costs, may be exacerbating coordination failures and increasing the gains from immigration policy coordination for all receiving countries.
Selection of Equilibria under Strategic Uncertainty
The previous section illustrates the possibility of coordination failures in immigration policy due to the presence of multiple Nash equilibria in the immigration policy game. Whether coordination failures actually occur depends on which equilibrium policy makers coordinate.
As shown above, the "payo¤-dominant" equilibrium, the one associated with policy h =^ 8h, is in the set of equilibria. This, however, is not necessarily the equilibrium that players select.
Experimental evidence on coordination games quite convincingly rejects the view that coordination problems will not occur in simple strategic interactions (Cooper et al., 1992, Van
Huyck et al., 1990). One possible rationalization of this evidence is that payo¤-dominance is not the only basis for coordination, and that players may converge towards other equilibria which present alternative salient features. An alternative proposed in this literature is that players coordinate towards the "risk-dominant" equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988), the key insight being that a strategy may be preferred over the other if it is less risky in the face of strategic uncertainty. 15 An evolution of this equilibrium selection criterion, which applies to games characterized by a continuous space of strategies (as the immigration policy game introduced in Section 3), is the robustness to strategic uncertainty ( Andersson et al., 2010) . Whenever a game admits a continuum of equilibria, even the slightest uncertainty about the opponents' strategies might lead each player to deviate from any given policy equilibrium. It is then "arguably reasonable to require equilibria to be robust to small amounts of uncertainty about other players'strategies" (Andersson et al., 2010, p.2). 16 In this subsection we prove that there is a unique equilibrium which is robust to strategic uncertainty and show that the robust equilibrium is di¤erent from the payo¤-dominant equilibrium. This result reveals that coordination failures in immigration policy are not only possible but also likely to emerge.
We …rst formally characterize strategic uncertainty in the immigration policy game. Following Andersson et al. (2010), we model strategic uncertainty by assuming that the probabilistic belief of policy maker h about the action of any other government j in the receiving economy is given by:~ hj = j + t" hj ;
where t 2 R + and " hj hj are statistically independent noise terms. The distribution hj belongs to an arbitrary family of probability distributions with non decreasing hazard rate function.
The introduction of this noise de…nes a new, "perturbed", game. Intuitively, the robust equilibrium is an equilibrium of this perturbed game when the noise tends to zero. More formally, if an equilibrium strategy pro…le ( r ; :::; r ) is the unique limit to any sequence of equilibria indexed by t as t ! 0, that strategy pro…le is robust to strategic uncertainty. In the next proposition we prove that such limit exists and is unique.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique equilibrium which is robust to strategic uncertainty.
This equilibrium, ( r ; :::; r ), is de…ned by W h ( r ; F ) = W h r ; F 8h and is Pareto-inferior to the payo¤ dominant equilibrium (^ ; :::;^ ).
Proof. In Appendix E.
Policy r is the one for which the incentives to restrict or loosen the immigration policy stance for each strategically uncertain government in the receiving region exactly o¤set each other. As shown in Figure 4 , the robust equilibrium of the immigration policy game corresponds to the point where the functions W h ( h ; F ) (the dashed curve) and W h h ; F (the dotted curve) intersect. In this point, denoted by A, the expected welfare loss associated with a policy higher or lower than the rest of the host region tends to zero.
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As there is a continuous strategy space, for any policy h , government h's subjective probability that any other government will choose exactly the same policy is zero. Hence, with probability one, policy h will either be the lowest or not. In the …rst case, country h will experience a crowding in, in the second it will experience a crowding out. In Figure 4 A comparison of the robust and Pareto-dominant equilibria sheds light on two issues.
First, under strategic uncertainty, the immigration policy equilibrium is distinct from the one that maximizes welfare for the entire host region. The policy strategy robust to strategic uncertainty can be more or less stringent than the optimal policy depending on the fundamentals of the economy (which determine the shapes of the two curves in Figure 4 ). In this model, where immigration has both bene…ts and costs for the host economy, the presence of an immigration policy spillover may, therefore, induce countries to select an excessively restrictive or loose policy. In other words, this model suggests that coordination failures driven by the immigration policy spillover can give rise to both a "race to the top" and a "race to the bottom" in immigration restrictions in receiving countries (see, for instance, Boeri and Brücker, 2005) .
Second, an increase in the international mobility of migrants ( ) does not a¤ect the optimal immigration policy but alters the robust equilibrium. Intuitively, the expected welfare loss associated with both a crowding in and a crowding out increases with the size of the immigration policy spillover (the dotted and the dashed curves in Figure 4 move further apart, while the position of the solid curve is not a¤ected by changes in , see Proposition 2). Therefore, globalization, in the sense of an increase in the international mobility of migrants, exacerbates the strategic uncertainty by increasing the set of Nash equilibria, and has an ambiguous e¤ect on the robust equilibrium on which governments coordinate.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has examined receiving countries'motives in setting immigration policy and how the institutional framework, particularly the absence of e¤ective coordination mechanisms, translates these motives into policy outcomes. The analysis shows that policy at home is in ‡uenced by measures adopted abroad. The reason is that migrants choose where to locate, in part in response to immigration policies in host economies. In the model, the international mobility of migrants gives rise to a policy spillover e¤ect which rationalizes the evidence in recent empirical studies on immigration. In this interdependent environment, immigration policy becomes strategic and unilateral behavior may well lead to coordination failures, where receiving countries are stuck in a welfare inferior equilibrium. The theory also shows that ine¢ cient policy equilibria are more likely to emerge when governments are uncertain about the immigration policy of other receiving countries and when the international mobility of migrants is stronger.
In the rest of this section, we discuss some implications of this model and come back to the initial question of this paper on the economic rationale for international institutions governing In facts, several international agreements and organizations aim at coordinating immigration policy. For instance, the stated objective of the International Organization for Migration is "to promote international cooperation on migration issues". Moreover, a forum for dialogue on migration and immigration policy is also provided by other international institutions, such as the OECD. While these arrangements help coordination through dialogue and the dissemination of information among receiving countries, they do generally not envisage an e¤ective enforcement mechanism. This implies that the uncertainty on other governments'strategies still characterizes policy makers'decisions, which can lead to coordination failures.
An exception is Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which
provides an opportunity to WTO Members to take on commitments regarding the temporary presence of "natural persons" from a di¤erent Member who supply a service. 17 While GATS Mode 4 has a limited scope, the binding nature of commitments within the WTO, backed up by the enforcement mechanism provided by its dispute settlement system, is an appealing feature of this system. 18 In this sense, expanding the scope of Mode 4 may be in the interest of receiving countries. However, one should be aware of the di¢ culties of this process. Immigration policy is not limited to border measures, but includes a large number 1 7 Natural persons falling within the scope of Mode 4 include independent contractual service suppliers and natural persons employed by service suppliers (WTO, 2004) . Speci…cally, Mode 4 concerns a narrow (and not clearly de…ned) subset of temporary migration, as it excludes coverage of access to labour market, citizenship and employment on a permanent basis (see WTO Annex on Movement of Natural Persons). 1 8 The size and scope of Mode 4 movements are an issue of current debate and negotiation. While a number of WTO Members have undertaken Mode 4 commitments that cover short-term employees (the US binding of 65.000 H-1B visas is a noteworthy example), the overall degree of Mode 4 commitments are low. WTO Members have generally granted access to selected categories of highly skilled persons linked to a commercial presence, such as managers, executives and specialists. The Hong Kong Ministerial declaration in December 2005 called for a new impetus on Mode 4 commitments (e.g. an extension of the categories of natural persons included in the commitments and of the permitted duration of stay), but improvements in the ongoing Doha negotiations have been so far slow to materialize (see Carzaniga, 2009 ).
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of behind-the-border measures that a¤ect the welfare of foreign workers in the host economy.
As the trade experience shows, regulating this policy can be extremely challenging.
Another implication of this analysis is that the extent of the coordination problem depends on the magnitude of the policy spillover e¤ect. In the model this is captured by the size of the parameter -i.e. the international mobility of migrants. While in the paper we emphasized technology as a determinant of this parameter, other factors can in ‡uence the responsiveness of foreign workers to immigration policy di¤erences. In particular, receiving countries that are more strongly interconnected, because of geographic proximity, common cultural background, or because they have formed an economic union, will experience stronger immigration policy 
A A Standard Model of Immigration Policy
This section introduces a speci…c model of immigration policy with standard features which may help give more structure to the reasoning developed in the main text. In particular, Subsection A.1 opens the "black box" of the welfare function we de…ned at the beginning of Section 2, W h (I h ). Subsection A.2 does the same for the migratory choice, by specifying the foreign workers'bene…t from immigration.
A generic receiving country, denoted by h ("home"), is populated by N h ("native") workers, each of whom supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and by K h capitalists, each of whom is endowed with one unit of capital. A …nal good is produced competitively via a constant-return-to-scale technology in labor and capital:
L h is the sum of natives and immigrants working in country h, that is, L h = N h +I h , where I h denotes the endogenous number of migrants. The …nal good is the numeraire in the receiving economy, and its price is normalized to one. As the product market is competitive, input factors are paid their marginal productivities:
Country h has a welfare system that, de facto, redistributes income from capitalists to workers. Speci…cally, the policy consists of a …xed lump-sum transfer h to (native and foreign) workers which is …nanced through a proportional tax h 2 [0; 1] on the capital rent.
This simple formulation captures the idea that welfare spending in h depends on the number of migrants. 19 A balanced government budget implies
and hence the tax rate on capital income, as a function of the number of immigrants is
A.1 The Optimal Number of Immigrants
We introduce a general representation of the Home government preferences over immigrants, which includes both the case where policy makers maximize the host economy's national welfare as well as the general possibility that governments are also motivated by the distributional e¤ects of immigration among natives. We assume that agents use their (disposable)
income to purchase the …nal good and have a linear utility function in consumption. Let us de…ne the objective function of the government as a function of the number of immigrants as
where we used the above balanced budget condition (5) to substitute for h and where
1] is the political bias (i.e. the weight on the utility of capitalists). This formulation includes as a special case national income maximization for = 1=2.
The optimal number of migrants in country h, denoted byÎ, is the one which maximizes condition (6) . 20 The FOC of this problem is
A numberÎ solving the FOC above is a maximum if the second derivative, evaluated inÎ, is strictly negative, that is, if
In Appendix B we provide a su¢ cient condition forÎ to be the global maximum, that is, the only politically optimal number of migrants for the host country.
A.2 The Migratory Choice
We can now be more precise about the net bene…ts from migration for foreign workers (b h ) and thus about their migratory choice. Bene…ts from migration are given by w h + h , that is, the salary plus the welfare transfer. Costs are given by h + i , that is, the policy plus the psychological cost. If we normalize the wage rate in the sending region (w ) to zero, a constrained foreign worker i will migrate to h if and only if
from which we can determine the threshold value of the psychological cost as
Thus the number of constrained migrants (as function of h ) will be h (1 )F=m.
On the other hand, a free foreign worker migrates to h if condition (7) holds, and if the payo¤ in h is higher than any other payo¤ in the rest of the host region, that is, if 21
Immigration ‡ows to country h are function of h's immigration policy as well as of the measures imposed in the rest of the destination countries. In particular, the number of free foreign workers actually migrating to h is 0 if h > h (crowding out), and h F if h < h (crowding in). Finally, if h = h , free migrants distribute symmetrically across the receiving region, that is, h F=m for any h.
The total number of migrants to country h can then be described as I h = h F h , where h = w h + h h and F h is given in (2).
B Characterization of the Pay-O¤ Function
The payo¤ function, which is de…ned only implicitly in the main text (expression (3)), can
here be characterized explicitly as
where h and F h are functions of both h and h , and F h is de…ned in (2) . Thus, we can draw three distinct welfare functions depending on whether h is higher, lower or equal to 
B.1 Strict Concavity of the Welfare Functions
Consider welfare function
The …rst derivative can be written as
30 where L h = N h + h F . It is now possible to calculate the second derivative as
where again L h = N h + h F . Simple algebra shows that the following condition on the parameters of the model ensures that @ 2 W h ( h ; F ) =@ 2 h is strictly lower than zero for any value of h :
We assume that this condition is satis…ed. Given that H(F ) is a decreasing function in F (and given that F <F < F ), condition (9) also ensures the strict concavity of the other two welfare functions, W h h ; F and W h h ;F .
C Proof of Proposition 1
Welfare function W h ( h ; F ) admits a global maximum in^ , and it is continuous, strictly decreasing and strictly concave in the interval ^ ;^ . Welfare function W h h ;F admits a global maximum in^ , and it is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the same interval ^ ;^ . Since W h ^ ;F = W h ^ ;F , and since^ <^ , then the two curves must cross once and only once in the interval ^ ;^ . Denote this intersection point by .
Moreover, for exactly the same reasons, it must be that W 8h is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game.
Since <^ < , policy^ is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Moreover, it is immediate to show that it is the optimal policy equilibrium: when all other countries h set up^ , then h =^ is the policy which maximizes welfare function W h h ;F , as it allows country h to attract the optimal number of migrantsÎ. Moreover, since W h h ;F is strictly increasing in h in the interval ;^ and strictly decreasing in the interval [^ ; ], it is also immediate to verify that the e¢ ciency loss is greater, the higher the distance from the optimal policy. This proves that the equilibria are Pareto-ordered by the distance of from^ .
Notice that any h < as well as any h > 8h are not Nash equilibria. Finally, a simple contradiction argument (drawn from Amir et al., 1996) proves that asymmetric equilibria do not exist in this policy game. Let ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ) be an asymmetric equilibrium (thus with at least two 's being distinct). Assume then, w.l.o.g., that 1 = max h f h g and 2 = min h f h g so that 1 > 2 . Since the game is symmetric, every permutation of ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ) is also an equilibrium. Consider for instance ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ) and ( 2 ; 1 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ). The fact that both of them are equilibria implies that country 1 strictly weakens its immigration policy from 1 to 2 as the other countries restrict theirs from ( 2 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ) to ( 1 ; 3 :::; h ; :::; m ), which contradicts the fact that country 1's best-response is nondecreasing (see expression (4)).
D Proof of Proposition 2
The lower threshold is by de…nition the immigration policy such that W h ;F = W h ; F , where, remind,F F=m and F (1 )F=m. Let us de…ne
as the implicit function of with respect to . It holds that
We show that d =d < 0.
The numerator writes as
The second term is null as W h ;F does not depend on . The …rst term can be shown to be negative. In fact
First note that @W h ; F =@I is positive since in point welfare increases with the number of immigrants. Second, since I = b F , it is @I=@F > 0. Finally, it holds @F =@ = F=m < 0. Then it is dW h ; F =d < 0 and hence dG=d < 0.
As regards the denominator in (10), it is
as in point it is dW h ; F =d h < 0 and dW h ;F =d h > 0. This proves that d =d <
0:
The proof that d =d > 0 is entirely analogous and is then omitted. Finally, it is trivial to show that the optimal policy is not a¤ected by an increase in international mobility.
Notice that function W h h ;F does not depend on , and thus^ , as a solution to equation dW h h ;F =d h = 0, will not depend on either.
E Proof of Proposition 3
The proof will follow closely the argument developed in Andersson et al. (2010) for the price competition game. Let t 2 R + and suppose that the government of each country h holds a probabilistic belief about any other government j's policy of the following form: W h ( h ; F ) :
The expression above represents the expected payo¤ of country h when setting up policy h . In particular, the …rst term is equal to the probability that h is lower than any other policy j 8j times the payo¤ associated with the resulting "crowding in". The second term is instead given by the probability that h is higher than at least one j times the payo¤ associated with the resulting "crowding out". The FOC for the maximization problem writes as where hj ( ) = 0 hj ( ). It can be proven that the objective function (12) is strictly concave along the interval ^ ;^ (to make the argument developed here less burdensome, this proof is provided separately in Subsection E1). Hence, every solution to the FOC above in that interval is a t-equilibrium.
Consider any sequence ht k i in order for the FOC to be satis…ed when ht k i 1 k=1 ! 0, it must necessarily be that
The expression above says that, in the limit, the sum of the instantaneous probabilities that any j is equal to h must tend to zero. This is true if j 6 = h 8j. We now show that this is impossible.
The fact that W h h ; F 6 = W h ( h ; F ) implies that, for the generic government h, W h h ; F is either higher or lower than W h ( h ; F ). Suppose for instance it is higher (the reasoning under the opposite case in which W h h ; F < W h ( h ; F ) is entirely analogous and is omitted). If that is the case then, in order for h to be a best response, it must necessarily be that r < h 6 j for any j. But since j > r , then also for country j it must be that W j j ; F > W j j ; F , and thus j 6 h for any h. The two implications are true only when h = j , which contradicts the above statement. As a result, in order for the FOC to be true, it must necessarily be that W h h ; F = W h ( h ; F ) whose solution is h = r for any h. This completes the proof.
E.1 Concavity of the Objective Function
We here prove that a su¢ cient condition for function (12) to be strictly concave along the interval ^ ;^ is that distribution hj has non-decreasing hazard rate. The FOC can equivalently be written as It is now easy to show that function @ t h ( ) =@ h is strictly decreasing in h . Starting from the …rst addend, its derivative has the following expression and is negative: where D ( ) stands for "derivative with respect to h ". For practical reasons, the signs of the four terms are denoted under each of them. In particular, while the signs of the last three terms are self-apparent, the …rst term is negative whenever h >^ .
Turning to the second addend, the expression under the product operator is decreasing (as the cumulative distribution hj ( ) is an increasing function of h ). 
